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Abstract
Researchers have acknowledged the existence of  free-riding in peer-to-peer networks. Krishnan et al. (2002a)
provide a plausible game theoretic explanation for the sustenance of cooperation in P2P networks and their
ability to tolerate free-riding. Our paper investigates this issue further using a computational model. We find
the Krishnan et al. (2002a) model to hold true only for a restricted set of assumptions.  We argue that, in
general, aggregation of individuals’ utility is necessary to explain the ability of P2P systems to tolerate free-
riders.  From our experiments we observe that the stability of the network is sensitive to the underlying
incentive structure of individual users. We suggest a detailed incentive structure for users participating on the
P2P network and examine this incentive structure in light of existing data of P2P usage. The findings of this
paper should be useful to researchers and practitioners for policy making, network design, regulating growth,
and deploying novel business models on P2P file sharing networks.
Introduction
The recent growth in peer-to-peer systems has raised several interesting issues for researches and practitioners alike. P2P systems
function with two important underlying notions:  (1) users are able to search and obtain a desired good from the network and
(2) users share their goods for other users of the network. 
It has been argued that digital goods on P2P networks can be treated as public goods (non-excludability in supply and non-rivalry
in demand) and there exists a social dilemma where individuals either contribute to the network and share goods or shrink and
free ride at the expense of other users who share (Adar and Huberman 2000; Hardin 1968; Krishnan et al. 2002b).  Traditional
economic analysis predicts a tragedy of the commons, where free-riding leads to overall degradation in system performance or
even collapse of the system (Adar and Huberman 2000; Hardin 1968).  While researchers have conclusively observed a high level
of free-riding on P2P networks (Adar and Huberman 2002; Saroiu et al. 2002), surprisingly enough these P2P systems have grown
steadily without any degradation of performance or collapse (Dignan 2002). 
Some recent work has attempted to explain this phenomenon by assuming altruism among users, whereby users share their goods
in spite of the cost involved, and derive value from other users benefiting from the download of these goods (Golle et al. 2001).
However, it is not reasonable to assume a significant level of altruism among users when (1) users are participating in an ad hoc
network of anonymous users and (2) users desire to maximize their own utility through download and consumption of goods
(Axelrod 1984; Bester 1998).  Golle et al. (2001) acknowledge the existence of the free-riding problem and propose a micro-
payment mechanism to encourage file sharing among users in P2P systems. Their model, however, does not explain the growth
in current P2P systems that operate in the absence of any such payment mechanism. Krishnan et al. (2002a) provide a game
theoretic analysis of individual users’ incentive to participate—download and share—without ascribing altruism among users.
Their model suggests a plausible explanation for the sustenance and growth of P2P systems in the absence of any kind of altruism
or micro-payment mechanism. The model suggests cooperation and sharing based on the notion of belief that, by sharing, few
users obtain a positive utility and they are strictly worse-off if they decide not to share. They argue that sharing is desirable for
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a certain number of users, as they believe that it would increase their utility to download. Using an agent-based experimental
setup, we simulated this  model over a range of values of the model variables. We found the model to hold true only for a
restricted set of assumptions. We argue that aggregation of individuals’ utility is necessary to explain the ability of P2P systems
to tolerate free-riders. The results of our experiments indicate that the stability of P2P networks is sensitive to the underlying
incentive structure of individual users. Changes in the individual’s incentive structure can bring about a sudden collapse of the
P2P file-sharing network. We carefully analyze the individual user’s behavior and the underlying incentive structure and suggest
the elements of a more detailed model that forms the subject of our ongoing research. We examine this model in light of the data
on existing P2P file-sharing network. Our analysis should be useful to researchers and practitioners for policy making, network
design, functional improvements, regulating growth, and deploying novel business models on P2P file sharing networks.
Agent-Based Model for P2P Networks
An individual’s incentive to participate in the P2P network is based on the utility one derives from participation. We used an
agent-based modeling(ABM)  technique to simulate the P2P network.  ABM is often used to model complex systems, consisting
of heterogeneous agents with micro-level behaviors and interactions, where the overall system-level behavior emerges from the
individual micro level interactions (Axtell 2000; Axtell et al. 2002; Epstein et al. 2002).  Based on Krishnan et al. (2002a), we
model the individual user’s utility  based on the value v one derives by downloading an item and the cost c one pays for sharing
files on the network. The value is private to the user and depends on her preference and evaluation of that good. A user also carries
a unique item that she can share if she decides to share.  This cost is also private and will differ across all users. Sharing cost
includes cost of hard-drive space, upload bandwidth consumption by other users, and fear of legal prosecution, among others. 
For a user i if p is the probability that she finds the desired good on the network and is able to download it, then the utility is given
by
U(i) =  p * vi -  Si ci ,    Si ε [0,1])
In their model, Krishnan et al. (2002a) suggest the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium such that, out of n original users, k
(0 <  k  <  n) users decide to share their content, while the rest do not.  This is based to two important underlying notions:
(1) The probability p of finding a desired good is a concave function in k.
(2) There exist a certain number of users who have private value vi and private cost ci such that sharing is desirable for those users
(Krishnan et al. 2002a). 
Krishnan et al. (2002a) modeled the user interaction on the network as a one-step game where individual users make their decision
to share or not to share based on the utility they obtain during the same time interval. In the ABM, we incorporate a history
element whereby users consider not only their current payoff but also value their past experience on the network. Users, therefore,
aggregate their utility over a period of time. This argument is reasonable as users typically participate on the P2P network for an
extended a period of time and they decide to share as long as their overall utility from participation is positive. One must also note
that participating users make the decision to download frequently, but the decision to share usually holds for extended periods.
Experimental Setup
Based on individual’s value for ci  and vi there can be three categories of users:  (1) ci > vi, (2) ci < vi, and (3) ci  = vi.  It is
important to understand the dynamics and behavior of the model over a range of values for variables  vi , ci, and aggregated utility
history H.  We modeled individual users as satisficing agents, i.e., they decide to share as long as their expected utility is positive.
The P2P network model consisted of 10,000 users with a set percentage (50 percent) of users initialized to share. Variables vi
and ci  were varied over the range (0.01 to 1) and aggregation of utility over a period of time H (1 and 2). 
Setup A:  vi = Uniform (0.0001 - 1); ci = 0.5, 0.1, 0.01; H= 1
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In this setup, users do not aggregate their utility and decide to share based on the utility in the same time cycle. When ci = 0.5,
we have on average 50 percent of total users with ci > vi .  When ci = 0.01, 1 percent of total users have ci > vi and the rest, 99
percent, have vi > ci.  We observe that cooperation (sharing) is not sustained in the network and the network collapses (refer to
Figure 1).  Therefore, when users do not aggregate their utility, there is no sharing among users even when 99 percent of the users
have vi > ci (in other words, even a few users with cost of sharing greater than value of downloading can lead to network collapse).
Figure 1.  Setup A with vi = Uniform (0.0001 - 1), ci = 0.01; H = 1
(Cooperation does not sustain in the network and the network collapses.  Total percentage of shares
decrease sharply over time and within t = 110 steps there are zero sharers from the initial 50 percent shares.)
Setup B:  vi  = Uniform (0.5 - 0.6);  ci = Uniform (0.3 – 0.4); H = 1
In this setup, users do not keep track of their utility history and decide to share based on the utility in the same time cycle. Here,
vi is strictly greater than ci for all users.  We observe that cooperation does sustain (refer to Figure 2).  There is sharing among
users and the network is able to tolerate free riders.
Similar results were obtained from experiments for setup A and B when varying the level of initial sharers (10 percent, 30 percent,
70 percent, and 90 percent).
Figure 2.  Setup B with vi = Uniform (0.5 and 0.6); ci = Uniform (0.3, 0.4)
(Cooperation sustains with total percentage of shares vary between
40 percent and 60 percent.)
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Setup C:  vi  = Uniform (0.0001 - 1);  ci  = Uniform (0.0001 - 1); H = 2 
In this setup, users aggregate their utility over two time cycles.  Here vi and ci both vary uniformly over the same range of values,
giving  on average 50 percent of users having vi > ci.  We observe that cooperation sustains (refer to Figure 3).  There is sharing
among users and the network is able to tolerate free riders. 
We performed experiments for setup C, with varying levels of initial sharers (10 percent, 30 percent , 70 percent, and 90 percent),
by varying the range of values  for vi and ci, and user’s utility aggregated over period of time (H > 2). Similar results were
obtained.
Figure 3.  Setup C with vi = Uniform (0.0001 - 1); ci = Uniform (0.0001 - 1); H = 2
(Cooperation does sustain in the network.  Total percentage of shares in the network
stabilizes at around 48 percent.)
We observe that the model fails to stimulate cooperation when viewed as a one-shot game. A simple and intuitive scheme of
adding a history element (i.e., aggregation of utilities over time) for the users is enough to sustain cooperation among users and
make the P2P network tolerate free-riding.
From the experiments, we also observed that sharing in the P2P model is sensitive with respect to the values of model variables,
calling for a detailed discussion on these variables. The next section suggests the elements of a more detailed model. 
A Detailed Incentive Structure
In the model above, the individual user’s utility was formulated by a single equation in vi and ci.  Here we consider a more detailed
formulation that analyzes an individual’s incentive to download and share separately.
Download
The value that a user derives from downloading a digital good from the network  is private.  However, downloading also inherits
a certain cost Cd for the user, i.e., like search cost, risk of getting bad quality goods. This cost is also private to the user but is
influenced by the network itself (design, traffic, etc.), and the actions of all users. There also exists a fear of prosecution Fd for
downloading illegal goods.  This cost, though private, can be influenced  by environmental factors, e.g., users fear increases if
they hear about a legal action against a P2P user by the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America). The overall value
one gets from searching, downloading, and consuming a digital good is a sum total of the benefits and cost associated with it. At
every unit of time on the network, users decide to download as long as the total value derived from downloading is positive.
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Utility Ud derived by user i from download is 
Ud(i) =  p * v(i)   - Cd(i) -  Fd(i)
Where p is the probability that a user i finds a desired item, Cd(i)  is the cost of downloading the desired item , and Fd(i) is the fear
of legal prosecution for user i.
Share
Users who share digital goods bear a cost for sharing and making the goods available for other users. The decision to share or not
is denoted by S. This sharing cost Cs includes the cost of allocating hard drive space, making upload bandwidth available for other
users, and keeping the machine and the application up and running. This cost is private to the user and is not influenced by the
network or any external factors. There also exists a fear of legal prosecution, Fs , for sharing illegal goods. Fs is private to the user,
but can be influenced by environmental factors as explained above. However, sharing is also desirable. As explained by Krishnan
et al. (2002a), at an overall network level, the probability of obtaining a desired digital good by an individual user increases as
more  users share. With this belief, which is modeled as a transform B(.) of the utility of downloading  Ud, users assign a positive
value to sharing, as it would increase their probability of finding a desired good when they download. This increases their
download utility and users share as long as their overall benefit from sharing is greater than zero.
Utility Us derived by user i from sharing is
Us(i) =  S(i) ( Bi(Ud(i)) -  Cs(i)  -  Fs(i))     (S(i) ε (0,1))
Where Bi(Ud(i)) = Belief of user i that sharing increases downloading utility, Cs(i)  is the cost of sharing and  Fs(i) is the fear of
legal action for user i.
The overall utility to participate is modeled as U(i)  = Ud(i)  + Us(i).  If U(i) < 0, a user will not participate, i.e., will neither
download not share. 
Examining the Proposed Incentive Scheme in Light of Existing Data
A measurement study of one such P2P file sharing network (Saroui et al. 2002) suggests that the users on the P2P network can
be classified into three broad categories:  (1) users with high downloads and high sharing, (2) users with high download and low
or no sharing, and (3) users with very low or no downloads and high sharing.
Existence of type-1 users can be explained by (1) low cost and low fear of participation (Cd, Cs, Fd, Fs ~0), and (2) high value of
belief that sharing increases download utility (Bi (Ud(i))>>0).
Existence of type-2 users can be explained by (1) low cost and low fear of download (Cd, Fd ~0), (2) high cost and fear of sharing
(Cs , Fs >>0), and (3) low value of belief that sharing increases downloading utility (Bi (Ud(i)) ~ 0).
However, existence of type-3 users is difficult to explain based on the proposed utility structure. These users have Us(i) > 0  as
they share.  But they have Bi(Ud(i)) ~ 0 as they do not intend to download.  Even if we assume the extreme situation where the
cost and fear of sharing for these users is near zero (Cs ~ 0, Fs ~ 0), there is no reasonable explanation for these users to share (i.e.,
Us(i) > 0).  Such users can be explained by assuming an element of  altruism.  Such users may include P2P network owners who
have a vested interest in the success of the system, and rebels who support P2P networks as a matter of principle, not utility.  We
can thus have 
Us(i) =  Bi (Ud(i))  -  Cs(i) - Fs(i)  + A(i) 
where A(i) represents the degree of altruism in user i, A(i) ~ 0 for most of the users and A(i)  > 0 for a very small proportion of
users.
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This model can be used to examine conditions for the sustenance and growth of P2P networks in the presence of free-riding.  For
example, one may argue that P2Pnetworks can sustain, grow, and at the same time tolerate free-riders, as long as the incentive
structure satisfies the following :
(1) Moderate proportions of users have belief Bi (Ud(i)) > 0
(2) Moderate proportions of users have cost of sharing Cs ~ 0
(3) Large proportions of users have low fear of download and share and low cost for download, Fd, Fs, Cd ~ 0
(4) Very small proportions of users have altruism A(i) > 0
It will be useful to examine the conditions essential for sustained cooperation.  Variables Cs and A(i) are private and are not
affected by the environment.  However, variables Bi(Ud(i)), Fs, Fd, and Cd,, although private, are influenced by the environment.
Individuals Bi(Ud(i)) and Cd can be altered by other P2P network users and P2P  application.  Bi(Ud(i)) will decrease significantly
if users fail to obtain their desired product from the network for extended periods of time. 
Existence of poor quality media or incorrect content on the P2P network can increase Cd. Increase in Cd beyond a threshold value
may lead to destabilization of the entire network.  Record label companies are known to adopt this policy by posting bad quality
music or corrupted media on the P2P network.  It must be noted that individual users assign their value to Bi(Ud(i)) and Cd  by
interacting with the entire network over a period of time. Thus, as the size of the P2P network increases it becomes extremely
difficult for a individual user or a group of peers to significantly change the value of Bi(Ud(i)) and Cd. P2P networks can, therefore,
exhibit a high level of tolerance against individuals attempt to destabilize the network by posting bad quality content. 
Such is not the case with Fd and Fs. These variables can be altered by environmental factors.  For example, by airing legal actions
against a few individual users, RIAA can increase the fear of participation. This can significantly decrease individual user’s utility
to share and download and can cause the entire network to collapse. 
Conclusion
Using Krishnan et al. (2002a), we develop an asgent-based model of P2P file sharing networks. We introduce the notion of history
and find that, in the general case, aggregation of utilities is essential to sustain cooperation and tolerate free-riding on the network.
This is achieved without the need for altruism on the part of the users. The model is sensitive to the underlying incentive structure
of individual users. 
To investigate this further, we propose a detailed incentive structure for individual users on P2P networks. Such an incentive
structure can lead to a P2P network that is robust with respect to free-riding, and poor quality content. However, it may be
susceptible to destabilization caused by factors like fear of prosecution. A model based on this incentive structure forms the basis
of our ongoing study. 
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